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1Semantic content and compositional context-sensitivity&
(Contenido semántico y sensibilidad composicional al contexto)
Esther romero*, Belén Soria
University of Granada, Spain
aBSTraCT: A variety of theorists have recently argued against the explanation of the semantic content 
of a sentence as a minimal proposition claiming that intentional aspects of the context are often needed to 
obtain a minimal proposition. Minimalists such as Borg, however, still defend intention-insensitive mini-
mal propositions for sentences in a narrow context and provide solutions or dissolutions against incom-
pleteness objections. In this paper, we show that these putative defences of propositionalism do not serve 
to avoid some additional genuine objections which arise from compositional context-sensitivity. We aim 
to show that there are complex expressions which compositionally demand intention-sensitive pragmatic 
effects in a mandatory way and, for that reason, they provide us with evidence against the type of proposi-
tionalism that substantiates the defence of semantic minimalism.
KEYWOrDS: Minimal proposition, incompleteness, propositionalism, minimalism, context-sensitiv-
ity, mandatory demand of contextual information.
resumen: Algunos teóricos han rechazado recientemente la concepción del contenido semántico de una ora-
ción como proposición mínima afirmando que para conseguir una proposición mínima a menudo se necesitan 
aspectos intencionales del contexto. Sin embargo, minimalistas como Borg siguen defendiendo que las oraciones 
en un contexto estrecho expresan proposiciones mínimas sin tener en cuenta las intenciones y lo defienden resol-
viendo o disolviendo las objeciones de incompletitud. en este artículo mostramos que esas supuestas defensas del 
proposicionalismo no sirven para evitar otras objeciones genuinas que dependen de la sensibilidad contextual 
composicional. Nuestro objetivo es mostrar que hay expresiones complejas que demandan composicionalmente 
de modo obligatorio efectos pragmáticos cuya recuperación depende de las intenciones y, por ello, proporcionan 
evidencia contra el tipo de proposicionalismo que fundamenta la defensa del minimismo semántico.
PALABrAS CLAve: Proposición mínima, incompletitud, proposicionalismo, minimalismo, sensibilidad 
contextual, demanda obligatoria de información contextual.
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1. Introduction
A semantic theory must specify how semantic contents are associated to expressions by an 
underlying linguistic code. The linguistic code consists of a system of expression-meaning 
pairs and lexico-compositional rules generating such pairs for an infinite number of expres-
sions (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 13). The decoded meaning that results from lexi-
con and syntax alone, however, is not enough to obtain truth-evaluable content for each 
sentence; it cannot always fix what state of affairs should obtain for a sentence to be true. 
This is easy to show since natural languages have context-sensitive expressions and their 
contribution to literal content is only fixed relative to the context in which they are ut-
tered. For example, (1)
(1) He is dead
does not by virtue of its encoded meaning express a proposition since the linguistic mean-
ing of the pronoun ‘he’, an overtly context-sensitive expression, needs the context to deter-
mine its propositional contribution. When (1) is taken as input, linguistic decoding results 
in an incomplete proposition,12in semantic underdeterminate content such as (1a).
(1a) Hex is dead at t12
(1a), a propositional function, is the sentence meaning expressed by (1). Thus, the result of 
linguistic decoding alone cannot give us propositions for all sentences. Contextual informa-
tion is needed to obtain the truth-evaluable or fully propositional content. No one disputes 
this. What is under dispute is whether the subject matter of semantics may also be, as the 
traditional mainstream formal semantics claims, fully propositional content.
On one side of the debate, the subject matter of semantics is taken to be fully propo-
sitional content. Sentences express minimal contents, that is, minimal propositions or mi-
nimal truth-evaluable contents. The meaning of indexical-free sentences such as ‘Stephen 
Hopkins is dead’ is context-invariant and they always express the same minimal proposi-
tion. By contrast, when sentences involve context-sensitive expressions, their propositional 
content is necessarily affected by pragmatic effects and it varies depending on the narrow 
context of their utterances, a context which is able to supply “a set of objective parame-
ters (such as world and time) and not rich, intensional aspects of the context of utterance, 
such as speaker beliefs or intentions” (Borg 2012, 13). The contextual influence is then li-
mited to rules that automatically pair properties of the context with semantic properties 
of the expression. The content so obtained is a minimal proposition. Borg (2012, 73) calls 
this propositional conception of the semantic content “propositionalism”3 and considers 
1 Strictly speaking, an incomplete proposition is not a proposition. As Neale says, “[n]o proposition 
blueprint is itself a proposition (any more than a building blueprint is a building). Many distinct prop-
ositions (or buildings) may satisfy a single blueprint” (2007, 79n7).
2 T1 indicates the location in time that needs to be fixed in correlation to the tense of the verb phrase. 
However, we are not going to extend the explanation specifying how it is determined to focus only on 
the resolution of the context-sensitivity of the pronoun.
3 Bach also uses the term “propositionalism” but he defines it differently. He understands it as “the con-
servative dogma that every indexical-free declarative sentence expresses a proposition” (Bach 2006, 
435). In Borg, the proposal is that every declarative sentence, indexical-free or not, expresses a proposi-
tion and for her it is not a dogma.
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it the core tenet of standard minimalism. In a propositionalist account of (1), the meaning 
of ‘he’, Hex in (1a), in a given narrow context c, “will contain a singular concept in subject-
position, the content of which is exhausted by the object to which the speaker refers” (Borg 
2012, xviii). In the case of (1), the hearer is able to think about that object under the token-
reflexive description ‘the actual male person referred to by the speaker with this token 
of (1)’. This description includes the referential expression, ‘this token of (1)’, which refers 
to a particular token of the sentence (1), (1).4 If (1) is uttered in January 1st 2018 by Daisy 
talking about Morris, the hearer is able to think of Morris under the mentioned token-re-
flexive description since he is the content of the singular concept being actual male 
person referred to by the speaker with (1). This does not entail that the hearer is 
able to non-linguistically identify the referent (Borg 2012, 141). If we take the previous ut-
terance of (1), the propositional content expressed would be (1b).
(1b) Morris is dead at January 1st 2018
The propositional content of the sentence uttered is not just a propositional function like 
(1a) but the full singular proposition (1b) which is automatically obtained from a narrow 
context.5
On the other side of the debate, authors such as Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995), reca-
nati (2004 and 2010), or Bach (2006) argue that contextual information has no role to play 
in semantics or if it does, it cannot always fix what state of affairs should obtain for each sen-
tence to be true. The subject matter of semantics is not always, or even for some theorists not 
ever,6 truth-evaluable content. Indeed, according to non-propositionalists this happens with 
(1). The personal pronoun ‘he’ underdetermines the semantic content expressed by (1) and 
the task of assigning a referent to eliminate its underdetermination cannot be realized with-
out appeal to rich aspects of the context. A personal pronoun such as ‘he’ refers to the male 
person which happens to be the most salient in the context at hand. But “salience” is a prag-
matic notion related to the speaker and her intentions (recanati 2004, 57). If Morris is the 
most salient male person at hand in the context of the utterance of (1), its speaker expresses 
(1b) but (1b) is pragmatically delivered; it is the utterance content rather than the sentence 
meaning. The sentence meaning, (1a), is the semantic underdeterminate part of (1b). (1b) is 
the “explicit” fully determinate propositional content which is intended by the speaker with 
her utterance and which results from enriching (1a). This enrichment involves reference as-
signments for Hex (Morris) and for the time of the utterance (January 1st 2018) and 
the reference assignments depend on Daisy’s intentions since without appealing to them the 
hearer cannot know who the speaker is referring to with her use of the expression ‘he’ and 
4 The bold type in (1) marks that it is the referent of ‘this token of (1)’. 
5 In addition to Borg (2004 and 1012), theorists such as Kaplan (1989) and Perry (2001) are also con-
sidered propositionalists. They all accept minimal propositions but they do not characterize them in 
the same way. For example, while according to Borg the minimal proposition expressed by (1) would 
be (1b), a singular proposition, for Perry, the minimal proposition would be The actual male per-
son referred to by the speaker with (1) is dead at t, a reflexive proposition.
6 Travis’s occasionalism (2006 and 2008) illustrates the form of non-propositionalism in which the ex-
istence of semantic contents is denied in general, since the meaning of words and the nature of con-
cepts are considered as context-variant.
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thus he cannot know what state of affairs should obtain for her utterance to be true. From 
this perspective, it is not possible to get (1b) automatically from a narrow context.
This argument comes under one of the strategies of the non-propositionalist to reject 
propositionalism. As Borg says, non-propositionalists use
arguments to the effect that lexico-syntactically determined content on some or perhaps all occa-
sions falls short of propositional content, so that in at least some cases there are no such things as 
the minimal propositions [standard] minimalism requires. (Borg 2012, xi)
Nevertheless, Borg thinks that they are not conclusive arguments against her view. The al-
leged cases in which there are no minimal propositions, according to her, depend on wrong 
explanations such as the one given for (1) by non-propositionalists. Propositionalists do 
not need to resort to salience to consider the contribution that ‘he’ can make to the mini-
mal proposition expressed by (1), (1b), as its propositionalist explanation illustrates. The 
minimal truth-evaluable content for sentences that involve lexical context-sensitivity can 
be delivered without appeal to rich aspects of the context. For other types of problem cases, 
propositionalism has, according to Borg, “a wider arsenal of defensive weapons available to 
it than is sometimes supposed” (2012, xiii).
In this paper, by contrast, we present new arguments in support of the position that se-
mantic content falls short of propositional content and thus against propositionalism. We 
are going to take into account certain types of cases of what we call “compositional context-
sensitivity”. These are examples of syntactically well-formed sentences which do not get fully 
propositional content from lexico-syntactic information plus narrow context alone. Two 
types of examples illustrate this. First, sentences such as ‘The burglar nightmare was over’ 
which include a noun-noun construction, ‘burglar nightmare’ in this case. This noun-noun 
construction demands a contextual provision of the relation between burglar and nightmare 
without which no proposition is expressed. Second, sentences such as ‘The ham sandwich is 
waiting for her check’ show lack of semantic coordination between some of their semantic 
constituents. In this case, there is a semantic mismatch between the meaning of the NP, ‘the 
ham sandwich’ and the meaning of the predicate, ‘is waiting’ and between ‘her’ and its ante-
cedent ‘the ham sandwich’. Thus, unless some pragmatic adjustment affects one or several 
semantic constituents of the sentence uttered, composition is not possible. An exploration 
of examples like these allows us to argue that, even if we accepted all propositionalists’ “de-
fensive weapons”, they are not wide enough to provide us with adequate explanations for all 
problem cases.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. In section 2, we consider in what 
terms the debate about the nature of semantic content of a sentence can be better under-
stood. To explain that, we look at different ways in which contextual information may 
be demanded to finally highlight that the crucial point of disagreement in this debate is 
whether truth-evaluable content can be delivered without appeal to rich aspects of the 
context or not. Problem cases for propositionalism will be more clearly understood taking 
into account those different ways. In section 3, we will revise the arguments used by Borg 
in her attempt to preserve propositionalism against some problem cases. In section 4, we 
argue that the cases of compositional context-sensitivity, introduced in section 2, consti-
tute a challenge to propositionalism which cannot be met by Borg’s standard minimalism. 
We will argue that some of them express incomplete propositions and that, in other cases, 
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the composition of meaning is not possible. We support the latter with some experimental 
data available and with evidence delivered by examples of anaphoric binding in metaphori-
cal or metonymical utterances. Finally, we summarise our arguments and examine the con-
sequences of our proposals and their effects on minimal propositions.
2. Propositionalism and mandatory demands of contextual information
To appreciate more clearly in what respects authors from different positions genuinely 
agree or disagree with standard minimalism and its propositionalism, in section 2.1 we 
frame the debate by considering the different types of demands of contextual information 
to obtain propositions.7 Since, as we show, the potential acceptance of optional demands is 
not the crucial point in the debate on propositionalism, we focus, in section 2.2, on man-
datory demands to establish a more fine-grained distinction, not only between truth-con-
ditional and linguistic mandatory demands for contextual information, but also between 
lexically and compositionally mandatory linguistic demands (romero and Soria 2013a, 
162-68). Using these distinctions, we characterize the problem cases for propositionalists 
in section 2.3. Some of the mandatory demands triggered by the problem cases are truth-
conditional and linguistic and some are only truth-conditional. This characterization will 
let us add other types of examples that are not usual in this debate, examples of composi-
tionally mandatory linguistic demands of contextual information.
2.1. The current debate on propositionalism
The most important difference between minimalists (of any kind) and contextualists is 
that the former do not accept optional demands of contextual information to get the prop-
osition explicitly expressed by the speaker. Contextualists argue that the contextual effects 
that are not triggered by lexico-syntactic properties of expressions may appear in the truth-
conditional content explicitly expressed by the speaker; they are contextual effects option-
ally demanded by the utterance. In a non-literal utterance of (2),
(2) There is a lion in the middle of the piazza
contextualists argue, the propositional content communicated by the speaker would be 
there is a statue of a lion in the middle of the piazza, propositional content 
which includes a modulated subpropositional content for ‘lion’ (recanati 2010, 14). The 
demand of this content is optional because it is not needed to obtain the minimal propo-
sition expressed with (2) by means of its lexico-syntactic information, to wit, there is a 
lion in the middle of the piazza.
As optional demands are demands of contextual information not needed to get a mini-
mal proposition, nothing else needs to be said about them in the debate on propositional-
7 Although it is usual to distinguish between mandatory and optional subpropositional processes (see 
recanati 1993, 2004 and 2010), we have argued in a previous work that it is not adequate to character-
ize every process of interpretation other than saturation as optional. Processes of modulation, for ex-
ample, may have mandatory demands (romero and Soria 2013a). That is the reason why we talk about 
mandatory/optional demands and not about mandatory/optional processes.
Esther romero, Belén Soria
56 Theoria, 2019, 34/1, 51-71
ism. By contrast, in our opinion, mandatory demands are central to this debate since even 
though they are generally accepted for overtly context-sensitive expressions, scholars do not 
agree on the types of mandatory demands and their characterization. Indeed, while stand-
ard minimalism defends that mandatory demands of contextual information can always 
be automatically resolved to get the proposition expressed by the sentence relative to nar-
row context, non-propositionalist accounts hold that the contextual information mandato-
rily demanded cannot be always automatically recovered just by appeal to narrow context. 
One of the ways some non-propositionalists justify this is their defence of the proposition 
explicitly expressed as an aspect of speaker meaning. For them, the proposition explicitly 
expressed is intended by the speaker and this determines their claim that intention-insen-
sitive contextual information is often not enough to obtain the minimal proposition. The 
semantic content of the sentence would be non-propositional if what semantics is taken 
to deliver is an aspect of speaker meaning. In non-standard minimalism such as Stanley’s 
(2000 and 2005), the intended proposition explicitly expressed is a minimal proposition 
obtained only by the resolution of mandatory demands of contextual information. As these 
resolutions are made taking into account intention-sensitive contextual information, the 
minimal proposition corresponds to the intuitive truth-conditions of the utterance and 
it is included in the speaker’s meaning. In this way, some non-propositionalists such as 
Stanley can also be called “minimalists”.8 By contrast, if what semantics is taken to deliver is 
not an aspect of speaker meaning, the semantic content does not need to coincide with or 
be a part of the proposition intentionally communicated by the speaker. As Bach, a recog-
nized non-propositionalist, states:
This notion [the semantic content] pertains to the character of the information available to the 
hearer in the process of identifying what the speaker is communicating, not to how that informa-
tion is exploited (…). (Bach 2001a, 157 and Bach 2001b, 25)
In this line, Bach (1994) accepts that semantic propositional content may be obtained in 
some cases from lexico-syntactic information plus narrow context alone (a theoretical pos-
sibility when a pure indexical is involved) but he does not accept this is possible in all ca-
ses. In this way, even though standard minimalism coincides with Bach’s proposal that 
what semantics delivers does not have to be an aspect of speaker meaning, Bach does not 
defend propositionalism. Like Bach, Stanley and recanati, we also argue that mandatory 
demands of contextual information cannot be automatically resolved to get the proposi-
tion expressed by the sentence relative to narrow context and thus we oppose the standard 
8 Despite what some theorists have argued (see, for example, Borg 2012 or Cappelen and Lepore 2005), 
to deny that the semantic content expressed by a sentence is propositional is not automatically to be-
come a contextualist. To be a contextualist also requires accepting the possibility of optional demands 
of contextual effects on what is said by an utterance. In this way, Stanley is a non-propositionalist that 
cannot be catalogued as contextualist but as indexicalist since he rejects optional demands of contex-
tual effects on truth-conditional content (recanati 2010, 13n3). His indexicalism is called “minimal-
ism” due to his defence of a minimal contextual influence which is linguistically demanded by means 
of context-sensitive expressions. However, his position differs from standard minimalism in accepting 
speakers intentions as a guide in the determination of the proposition expressed; his minimal proposi-
tions are related to what the speaker says and not to what the sentence says (Stanley 2000 and 2005). 
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minimalist’s defence that the minimal proposition serves to fix the truth-evaluable content 
of the sentence without appeal to rich aspects of the context.
2.2. Mandatory demands of contextual information
Standard minimalism depends on the following assumptions:
ii(i) that the contextual influence on the proposition explicitly expressed is always de-
manded mandatorily
i(ii) that all mandatory demands of contextual information are traced to a lexico-syn-
tactic item.
(iii) that all mandatory demands must be resolved automatically from a narrow con-
text.
There may be different types of attacks on these claims. Against (i), it can be argued that 
the demand of contextual information is not always mandatory (there may be optional 
demands). Nevertheless, we have already argued that the rejection of (i) is not the cru-
cial point in the debate on propositionalism. Thus, we are going to focus on why (ii)-(iii) 
should be rejected taking into account different types of mandatory demands of contextual 
information. Against (ii), it can be argued that mandatory demands are not always triggered 
by some lexico-syntactic item. On the one hand, mandatory demands may be non-linguis-
tic and on the other, linguistically mandatory demands may be triggered by compositional-
ity. This typology permits us to go against (iii) since, once the types of mandatory demands 
of contextual information are extended, it is more difficult to argue that all can be resolved 
automatically from a narrow context.
When the linguistic meaning of a well-formed sentence is not enough to get a propo-
sition, a truth-evaluable content, contextual information is demanded obligatorily. This 
gives us a truth-conditional characterization of mandatory:
MandatoryT
A pragmatic effect is mandatory when it is required to get a proposition, content evaluable 
from a truth-conditional point of view.
Pragmatic effects are only triggered as something indispensable for the expression of a de-
terminate propositional content, that is, as something indispensable for content to be eval-
uable.
Contextual information may also be demanded by the linguistic properties of expres-
sions. Being linguistically mandated in virtue of lexical or syntactic properties of the expres-
sion type, pragmatic effects have to occur on all occasions on which a given expression is fe-
licitously used. This gives us a linguistic characterization of mandatory:
MandatoryL
If a pragmatic effect is needed in virtue of lexical or syntactic properties of the expression 
type, it is, from a linguistic point of view, mandatory.
The linguistic criterion for “mandatory” elaborated by many theorists intends to include 
the truth-conditional criterion since if linguistic meaning requires certain contextual in-
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formation and this is not considered, then, there would not be a complete propositional 
content. The linguistic demands are also truth-conditional, they are mandatoryLT. For ex-
ample, in (1) the demand of contextual information is mandatoryLT. It is mandatoryL since 
there is a context-sensitive expression, ‘he’, demanding contextual information by its lexical 
properties. It is also mandatoryT because, without the contextual information, what is said 
by (1), (1a), does not fix truth-conditions that allow its evaluation.9
Conversely, the truth-conditional criterion tends to include the linguistic one since when 
a pragmatic effect is required to get a proposition it must in fact be traceable to something in 
the syntax (Stanley 2000, 391; Borg 2012, 66). Indeed, some of the more emblematic prob-
lem cases that have been introduced in the discussion as mandatoryT have consistently been 
also taken as mandatoryL. We are referring to Bach’s cases of completion for which accord-
ing to him there is no linguistic trigger (see his explanation of (4)-(7) below). However, many 
authors argue that they are not cases of completion but of covert context-sensitivity (Stanley 
2000; recanati 2010). Both alternative ways of explaining them, nevertheless, are not options 
for propositionalists. Considering them as cases of completion, as Bach does, entails denying 
propositionalism even for context-insensitive sentences. Considering them as cases of covert 
context-sensitivity, as Stanley or recanati do, also comes at a cost: not all mandatory demands 
can be resolved automatically from a narrow context and not all mandatory demands are al-
ways traced to a lexical item; mandatoryL demands may arise lexically or compositionally.
The propositionalist also thinks these two criteria for mandatoriness are coextensive 
although she only admits, as we show in section 3, that there are lexical mandatoryLT de-
mands. Only these cases can be explained taking into account narrow context. This com-
pels her to provide alternative explanations for the additional challenging cases that are 
shown below.
2.3. Problem cases
Example (1) was used in the Introduction to show one of the problem cases for proposi-
tionalism. In (1), there is a mandatoryLT demand of contextual information, as we have 
just seen, and non-propositionalists argue that this demand appeals to rich aspects of the 
context. Another example in which the demand to reach propositional contents is manda-
toryLT is (3).
(3) That is red
‘That’ belongs to the same category as ‘he’, they both are context-sensitive expressions. The 
minimal proposition related to (3) cannot be obtained without appeal to speaker’s referen-
9 However, not every linguistic demand has to be truth-conditional. Conventional implicatures and ut-
terance modifiers serve to show this (romero and Soria 2013a, 166-68). For example, the meaning of 
‘but’ sets up a slot to be saturated by a proposition stating that the conclusion supported by the first 
conjunct is refuted by the second. Thus, the sentence ‘He is rich but stupid’ expresses the proposition 
that the person in question is both rich and stupid and linguistically conveys as a conventional impli-
cature that his being intelligent given his richness is refuted by his unexpected stupidity. Only the first 
proposition determines the truth-evaluable content of the sentence. Saturation of the propositional 
variable is linguistically mandated but its resolution is not part of the propositional content of the sen-
tence (the demand is then mandatoryL but not mandatoryT).
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tial intentions. However, the propositionalist opposes non-propositionalism by the use of 
token-reflexive descriptions to get the minimal proposition for examples such as (1) and (3).
In addition, indexical-free declarative sentences such as (4)-(6)
(4) Jill went to a local bar
(5) John is coming
(6) Flintoff is ready
have often been used by non-propositionalists to argue that we cannot attribute truth or 
falsity to the claims they express without appeal to rich aspects of the context. (4) cannot 
express a complete proposition without knowing with respect to whom the bar is local. (5) 
cannot express a complete proposition unless a place John is coming to or from is estab-
lished. (6) does not deliver a proposition until we know what Flintoff is ready for. (4)-(6) 
demand truth-conditionally contextual information and thus they are considered cases 
of incompleteness. In particular, examples such as (4)-(6) are cases of what Bach calls “se-
mantically underdeterminate sentences” (1994, 133). Their sentence meanings are propo-
sitional radicals, syntactically complete forms that lack determinate truth-conditions; they 
are semantically incomplete (Bach 2000, 263n3). For Bach, these expressions do not lin-
guistically trigger contextual information. They only truth-conditionally trigger a prag-
matic process of global completion to recover a conceptual portion needed to get a full 
proposition. Their demand of contextual information is only mandatoryT.
Similarly, the examples that involve a noun-noun construction can be used to show 
that a sentence including a noun-noun construction does not express a complete proposi-
tion if the relation between the nouns is not established. A sentence such as (7)
(7) The burglar nightmare was over
does not express a complete proposition unless the content of the complex expression ‘bur-
glar nightmare’ is pragmatically fixed through the contextual provision of a relevant rela-
tion between burglar and nightmare. There is a mandatoryT demand of contextual infor-
mation to determine the relation. Examples such as ‘burglar nightmare’ are cases of what 
Bach calls “semantic underdetermination at a phrasal level” (1994, 150). For him, certain 
sorts of phrases such as adjective-noun (e.g. ‘happy days’) and noun-noun phrases (e.g. 
‘child abuse’) are underdeterminate phrases that need filling in. These expressions truth-
conditionally trigger a pragmatic process of local completion.
Bach admits that underdetermination may arise in sentences, examples (4)-(6), or in 
phrases, example (7), although their constituents (words) are not context-sensitive lexical 
expressions; they all trigger non-linguistically and truth-conditionally pragmatic effects and 
are used by Bach to show that indexical-free declarative sentences cannot express full prop-
ositions (see note 3 above).
Once we admit that (7) demands contextual information truth-conditionally, it is easy 
to see that there are other examples that demand contextual information in that way. Let’s 
consider sentence (8).
(8) The ham sandwich is waiting for her check
(8) does not express a literal minimal proposition nor does it fix literal truth-evaluable con-
tent since, without a pragmatic adjustment and simply in virtue of the standing meaning of 
words, we do not know what the world would have to be like for the content expressed by 
Esther romero, Belén Soria
60 Theoria, 2019, 34/1, 51-71
(8) to obtain. recanati (2013, 177) accepts that (8) is a case of compositional modulation 
and he says that “cases of compositional modulation are mandatoryT”.
As we have said in section 2.2, many theorists think the truth-conditional criterion for 
“mandatory” includes the linguistic criterion. For them, if in examples (4)-(8) the demand 
of contextual information is mandatoryT, it must also be mandatoryL. They have to be ex-
amples of covert context-sensitivity. They are not indexical-free declarative sentences. They 
mandate the pragmatic process of saturation.
In this way, ‘local’ in (4), ‘come’ in (5) and ‘ready’ in (6) may be considered as lexical 
items associated with covert variables in the syntax (Stanley 2000). In these cases, there is a 
mandatoryL demand of contextual information due to the meaning of the lexical item.
(7) has also been considered a case in which covert variables in the syntax appear but 
the mandatoryL demand is due to a particular construction. It is an example of what re-
canati (2010, 37n4) calls “constructional context-sensitivity” which is different from the 
lexical one since in ‘burglar nightmare’ there is no articulated expression that stands for the 
relation needed between burglar and nightmare. In every case of noun-noun construction 
there is a mandatoryL demand of contextual information. It is linguistically mandated by 
the attempt at combining two expressions to get a more complex one. In this sense, this is a 
compositionally mandatoryL demand. In order to get the semantic content of (7), we need 
to assign a value to the covert variable that linguistically (or constructionally) mandates the 
pragmatic process of saturation of the relation that nightmare bears to burglar.
Once we admit that there is a compositional mandatoryL demand by a syntactic rather 
than merely lexical form, we may also claim that examples such as (8) demand contextual 
information not only truth-conditionally (to get the composition of the propositional con-
tent) but also linguistically. The demand of contextual information arises compositionally 
due to the lack of semantic coordination between its semantic parts, between the meaning 
of the NP, ‘the ham sandwich’, and the meaning of the predicate, ‘is waiting for her check’. 
Furthermore, there is no agreement between the anaphoric pronoun ‘her’ and the subject. 
The NP as subject of ‘is waiting’ should express “a property of beings, not one of culinary 
objects” (Sag 1981, 285). Since there is no element in (8) with the feature [+animate be-
ing] to get such a thematic role for the subject, the composition of the meanings of the 
NP and the predicate is not possible. No resulting meaning is available to obtain a proposi-
tion with both of them as constituents. Unless either the subject or the predicate takes on 
a non-literal meaning, no proposition is obtained and thus there is a mandatoryLT demand. 
Stern (2006 and 2011) considers examples of this type as cases that include covert variables 
which have to be saturated to allow composition.
Using our more fine-grained distinction of mandatory demands of contextual informa-
tion, we classify, in Table 1, the different types of examples of linguistic underdetermina-
tion, which according to non-propositionalists may be taken as problem cases for standard 
minimalism.
Of these three kinds of examples, the first (lexical mandatorylt) are examples in which 
there are linguistic demands of contextual information and the linguistic demands are 
signal-driven by the lexical properties of the expression (examples (1) and (3)). Every-
one agrees that they are context-sensitive expressions. By contrast, there is no consensus 
(indicated with “–/+” in Table 1) on whether the second and third set of examples, ex-
amples (4)-(6) and (7)-(8), truth-conditionally and/or linguistically demand contextual 
information. Authors such as Bach believe that in examples (4)-(7) the demand is only 
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mandatoryT. Many non-propositionalists believe that it is also mandatoryL. With respect 
to (8), recanati (2013) thinks it is just mandatoryT while authors such as Sag, Stern or we 
ourselves maintain it is mandatoryLT. Those who defend the mandatoryL character of ex-
amples (4)-(8) also consider them as context-sensitive expressions. This is not, as we will 
come to see in the next section, the position of standard minimalism.
Table 1
mandatoryl
mandatoryt examples of problem cases for standard minimalism
Lexical Compositional
+ – + (1) He is dead(3) That is red
–/+ – –/+
(4) Jill went to a local bar
(5) John is coming
(6) Flintoff is ready
– –/+ –/+ (7) The burglar nightmare was over(8) The ham sandwich is waiting for her check
3. Borg’s minimalist approach to problem cases
The position of a standard minimalist such as Borg with respect to (1) and (3)-(8) may be 
condensed in the following. The examples of the first type of Table 1 express full proposi-
tional content in the way explained using (1) in the Introduction. Her line of argument for 
problem cases of the second type is twofold. On the one hand, she groups examples such as 
(4) with the first type of examples, examples of genuine context-sensitivity. On the other, 
she rejects that examples such as (5)-(6) require any kind of pragmatic resolution. (5)-(6) 
are understood as cases including a context-insensitive covert syntactic structure. They do 
not demand contextual information. Problem cases of the last type are not recognized as 
such by propositionalists either. Let us see this in detail.
The problem raised by examples such as (1) and (3) is that they include words that are 
marked at the lexical level as overtly context-sensitive expressions and, according to non-
propositionalists, their contribution to the minimal proposition depend on wide context. 
Against this, the minimalist argues that in the case of (1), the hearer is able to think about 
Morris under the token-reflexive description ‘the actual male person referred to by the 
speaker with this token of (1)’ and narrow context is enough to automatically get the prop-
osition expressed by (1), (1b). In the case of (3),
(3) That is red
the semantic content a hearer should entertain will contain a singular concept in subject-
position whose content is exhausted by the object to which the speaker refers in a given 
context. All that is required is that the hearer be able to think about that object under the 
token-reflexive description ‘the actual object referred to by the speaker with this token of 
(3)’. By admitting the token-reflexive description as what allows thought of the referential 
constituent of the minimal proposition without appeal to wide context, Borg thinks she 
Esther romero, Belén Soria
62 Theoria, 2019, 34/1, 51-71
can avoid the non-propositionalist objection. Examples of the first type in Table 1 express 
full propositional content without appeal to speaker’s intentions.
A different problem is the one raised by examples such as (4)-(6), the second type of ex-
amples in Table 1. Borg (2012) follows two different lines of attack on the underdetermi-
nation arguments used by her opponents in such cases. On the one hand, putatively incom-
plete expressions such as ‘local’ in (4) are in her view genuinely context-sensitive elements 
and they should be treated like ‘he’ in (1) or ‘this’ in (3). In (4) the demand of contextual 
information from narrow context is mandatoryLT. In her words:
there are reasons to think that, on reflection, ordinary subjects do respond to words like ‘local’ 
and ‘left’ in just the same way that they respond to ‘this’ and ‘that’, treating them as having a lexi-
cal meaning which is genuinely context-sensitive. (Borg 2012, 89-90)
On the other hand, she explains that intuitive judgements of incompleteness by language 
users on examples such as (5) and (6) are misplaced (2012, 103). She denies that “the pu-
tatively problematic cases are really problematic at all” (Borg 2012, 111). The problems of 
incompleteness are just apparent. In her view, the intuitions of incompleteness apparently 
emerge around this kind of well-formed sentences from some overlooked context-insensi-
tive covert syntactic structure. The propositional semantic content expressed by (5) would 
be John is coming somewhere. (5) involves a hidden context-insensitive syntax. The 
standard minimalist concedes that, in cases such as (5), there are syntactically realized but 
phonetically null elements (Borg 2012, 19). In this way, there is no mandatory demand 
of contextual information in (5). A similar explanation is offered for (6), where ‘ready’ is 
a context-insensitive expression whose contribution to the logical form of the sentence is 
more complicated than might initially have been thought by only looking at the vocalized 
material (Borg 2012, 214). Following organizational lexical semantics (OLS) to account 
for how words may be appropriately concatenated, Borg claims that (6), a case of incom-
pleteness for non-propositionalists, might be treated as expressing the full proposition that 
there is something for which Flintoff is ready since this example has the un-
derlying logical form ‘∃x ready <f, x>’. In her words:
It is this which explains the apparent sense of incompleteness that subjects experience given 
the sentence ‘Flintoff is ready’, produced with no supporting context. On the current model, the 
sense of incompleteness is explained by the fact that ‘ready’ is grouped within the lexicon with 
other two-place expressions, thus hearers tacitly recognize that the vocalized material fails to 
mark all the argument places associated with the terms in the sentence. It is this recognition of 
a disparity between vocalized constituents and the arguments to be found at the level of logical 
form which results in our sense of incompleteness. (Borg 2012, 203)
This sense of incompleteness, however, does not lead her to claim that judgements of 
speech act content must be included in the proposition expressed because the logical form 
‘∃x ready <f, x>’ is part of the encoded meaning of the expression ‘ready’.
Let’s now turn to examples such as (7) and (8).
(7) The burglar nightmare was over
(8) The ham sandwich is waiting for her check
(7) is an example in which the underdetermination of linguistic meaning appears at local 
level by a semantically underdeterminate phrase. Local completion, Bach (1994, 152) says, 
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is achieved by insertion of the missing conceptual portion. As we have just shown, to ad-
dress the challenge raised by (4)-(6), Borg claims that their incompleteness emerges either 
from a genuine case of overt context-sensitivity (example (4)) or from some overlooked 
context-insensitive covert syntactic structure (examples (5) and (6)) where incompleteness 
is just apparent. Does one of these explanations serve to explain (7)? Is (7) a genuine case 
of overt context-sensitivity? Is it a case of covert context-insensitivity? Standard minimal-
ists have not given any answer but we think that these questions would probably receive a 
negative answer. On the one hand, (7) cannot be considered as a case of context-sensitivity 
as in (1), (3)-(4) since there is no context-sensitive lexical item in (7). On the other, there is 
no word in (7) that can be grouped with an expression demanding a covert context-insen-
sitive structure as it is the case of the use of ‘coming’ in (5) or ‘ready’ in (6). Nevertheless, 
Borg might claim that it is the noun-noun construction itself that marks ‘burglar night-
mare’ as a covert context-insensitive structure and that (7) means something like what-
ever the relation between burglar and nightmare denotes, the burglar 
nightmare is over.10 (7) would not be a case of underdetermination after all and thus 
there would be no mandatory demand of contextual information.
What about (8)? The problem we raised for (8) is not considered by Borg either. For 
us, no literal reading is possible for (8) because the phrase ‘the ham sandwich’ cannot con-
tribute to the semantic content just by appeal to its linguistic meaning and narrow context. 
In this case, however, we may resort to Borg’s account on metaphor to consider what she 
might say. Let’s consider the following quotations.
Metaphor remains unique due to the special behaviour of the figurative interpretation function f, 
which takes us from a proposition literally expressed to an entirely different proposition via esta-
blished non-semantic, conceptual relations […]. (Borg 2001, 245)
And she adds that her approach
agrees with the pragmatist that the formal theory yields something like a ‘minimal proposition’, 
and that there is then some kind of ‘moving on’ from this minimal proposition to some further 
conveyed proposition. Both the CC [“Conceptual Connection”] and the pragmatist accounts 
thus see literal and metaphorical interpretations as existing side by side, allowing interlocutors to 
switch between literal and metaphorical readings. (Borg 2001, 246)
If we take this into account, we can assume that she would claim that (8) is not a semanti-
cally underdeterminate sentence. Indeed, she argues for a theory of metaphor which pre-
supposes a literal reading of sentences; sentences that express (obviously) false literal prop-
ositions. Borg’s explanation of metaphor rests on the unargued assumption that literal and 
metaphorical propositions exist side by side. Other authors do provide arguments for a de-
fence of a literal proposition for non-literal sentences. Stanley (2005, 231) uses example (9),
(9) a. [A:] The ham sandwich is getting annoyed.
 b. [B:] That’s absurd; sandwiches do not get annoyed.
to claim that B’s reply provides evidence that the sentence uttered by A expresses an absurd 
proposition. If Borg gave an explanation in this vein, she could claim that there is no under-
10 We are thankful to one of our reviewers for bringing this point to our attention. 
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determination in (8). The problems of non-literal uses would be just apparent for proposi-
tionalists and the literal semantic content expressed by (8) would be a full proposition.
From all this, we can conclude that Borg argues that (1) and (3)-(4) are genuine cases 
of overt context-sensitivity and that (5)-(7) are wrongly conceived as cases of incomplete-
ness from misplaced intuitions while they really are examples including a context-insensi-
tive covert syntactic structure. In addition, we can assume that, for her, (8)-(9a) express lit-
eral propositions even if they are obviously false or absurd. Thus, as shown in Table 2, in 
minimal semantics the cases of underdetermination can be simplified.
Table 2
mandatoryl (Lexical) mandatoryt examples
+ +
(1) He is dead
(3) That is red
(4) Jill went to a local bar
Borg’s explanations (potential or explicit) to solve or dissolve the problems posed by exam-
ples (4)-(8) show that in her propositionalist account the two types of mandatory demand 
previously mentioned in section 2.2 are coextensive and affects only (1) and (3)-(4).
However, we have given in section 2.2 reasons to claim that the problem cases of the 
last type, examples (7) and (8), have to be included as cases of compositional context-sensi-
tivity. We argue in section 4 that Borg’s alleged solution for (7) cannot be used to dissolve 
the problem raised for this example and that her theory of non-literal examples is not ad-
equate for an explanation of (8) or (9a). Standard minimalism does not really have an al-
ternative explanation for these examples as it does for (1), (3)-(6). (7) and (8)-(9a) are ex-
amples in which, according to us, there are linguistic demands compositionally-driven by 
the combinatorial properties of complex expressions and this context-sensitivity is, as we 
will come to see in section 4, as unavoidable as lexical context-sensitivity is in examples like 
(1) and (3)-(4). Their context-sensitivity, however, cannot be resolved in the same way, by 
means of a token-reflexive description. Instead, their resolution depends on some non-au-
tomatic pragmatic process such as modulation or local supplementation.
4. Additional evidence against propositionalism: compositional context-sensitivity
Let’s assume that Borg claims it is the noun-noun construction itself that marks ‘burglar night-
mare’ as a covert context-insensitive structure and that the information available to the hearer 
for a noun-noun construction is always whatever the relation between N and N de-
notes, the NN (…). However, we find it implausible to hold that (7) can be understood as 
expressing something like whatever the relation between burglar and night-
mare denotes, the burglar nightmare is over and that this is a full proposition.
The problem of this proposal is that establishing any relation between two common 
nouns does not allow us to fix a complex concept as it is required for the description (Sag 
1981, 288-89). It could be argued that (7) expresses a general proposition which fixes the 
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following truth-conditions: the unique satisfier of the predicate ‘is a burglar nightmare 
whatever the relation between burglar and nightmare denotes’ also satisfies the predicate ‘is 
over’. Nevertheless, without specifying the relation of burglar with nightmare, the meaning 
of ‘the burglar nightmare’ in a given narrow context will not denote a concept of nightmare 
constrained by the meaning of ‘burglar’ in a determinate way that allows the hearer to grasp 
the condition encoded by the complex description. The restrictive modifier cannot con-
strain the denotation of ‘nightmare’ and thus ‘burglar’ is not performing its linguistic task. 
The content of the description does not get fixed. Thus what semantics delivers for a sen-
tence such as (7) will not be something capable of truth evaluation, something the hearer 
can think of. If this is so, the content of the minimal proposition is not graspable. rather, it 
is merely a succession of propositional constituents that has not admitted semantic compo-
sition since some subpropositional component of content (the relation) is missing.
Let’s now consider (8) and (9a), the other type of examples in which underdetermina-
tion of a complex expression appears. In this case, Borg can reject context-sensitivity claim-
ing that there is a minimal proposition expressed by (8) which is obviously or trivially false 
(and thus inappropriate) or, as Stanley says for (9a), absurd. However, as we will come to 
see, this cannot be argued. Indeed, we are going to show that sentences such as (8) or (9a) 
do not express literal propositions because they lack semantic coordination. We support 
this claim with some experimental data available and with evidence delivered by examples 
of anaphoric binding in metaphorical or metonymical utterances.
In our opinion, (9b) does not prove that there is a literal proposition. That sandwiches 
do not get annoyed is just a metalinguistic negation and the absurdity, which we prefer to 
call “abnormality” (romero and Soria 2016, 157), arises in these cases precisely out of lack 
of semantic coordination. The lack of semantic coordination between its semantic parts in-
dicates that (9a) is semantically ill-formed. When (9a) is said to express an obviously false 
or absurd proposition, “obviously false” and “absurd” do not oppose “true”, they oppose 
“semantically well-formed” and, this is a clear indication that there is no literal proposition 
(romero and Soria 2013b, 46).
The absurdity or abnormality generated by the lack of semantic coordination between 
the semantic parts of (9a) blocks entertainment of a literal reading. Lack of semantic coor-
dination indicates linguistically that there is no literal proposition available and that a prag-
matic adjustment of at least one of the semantic parts is expected. Since a sandwich cannot 
saturate the argument slot for an animate being required by the predicate ‘is getting an-
noyed’, the hearer will resort to any relevant information from rich aspects of the context 
in order to saturate the argument slot with relevant information, guided by his attempt to 
get what the speaker intends to convey.
The demand of contextual information is not only mandatoryL and arises composi-
tionally due to lack of semantic coordination, it is also mandatoryT. Without some prag-
matic adjustment, the context-insensitive parts of (9a) are decoded into semantic content 
that, nevertheless, does not determine an evaluable content. The semantic content of (9a) 
does not provide us with the information to know what the world (real or fictional) would 
have to be like for the content expressed by the sentence to obtain. A ham sandwich can-
not literally get annoyed unless the linguistic meaning of ‘ham sandwich’ is adjusted to fit 
the requirements of the predication. To make (9a) interpretable, some pragmatic adjust-
ment is needed. For example, ‘ham sandwich’ may change its denotation from an inanimate 
entity to an animate one. However, this is already an adjustment of the linguistic meaning 
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of ‘ham sandwich’ since its contribution to the proposition would not be made by its lin-
guistic meaning (two slices of bread with a layer of ham) but by its pragmatically derived 
fictional ad hoc concept (two slices of bread with a layer of ham capable of being sentient 
and experience annoyance). No meaning is available as the result of the composition of the 
conventional lexical meanings of its constituents. The semantic content of (9a) cannot be a 
proposition; it cannot be grasped without appealing to rich aspects of the context.
As it happens in (8) and (9a), (10)
(10) The wilting violet left the room
shows lack of semantic coordination between its semantic parts. As far as our linguis-
tic competence is concerned, this predicate cannot make its semantic contribution to the 
clause since its meaning is the type of action that typically needs an animate agent to fill in 
the semantic role of its subject, something that the flower is not. Even if syntactically speak-
ing ‘the wilting violet’ is the subject of (10), semantically speaking, ‘the wilting violet’ does 
not coordinate with the predicate. It is not possible to think about the facts of the matter 
in the world that can be a flower literally leaving the room. (10) does not have the minimal 
level of meaningfulness to express a full literal proposition. Unless some expressions take on 
some non-literal meanings depending on the context (metonymical, metaphorical or even 
fictional), no proposition is obtained.
The lack of semantic coordination in (10) compositionally demands a pragmatic proc-
ess even if the type of process and the content cannot be specified without taking into ac-
count a particular utterance of (10). The NP in subject position in (10) may be used meto-
nymically to refer to a woman wearing a wilting violet on her sleeve and thus ‘the wilting 
violet’ has to be metonymically interpreted by means of a pragmatic operation of supple-
mentation of conceptual material (romero and Soria 2013c, 150). Or it may be used to re-
fer to a woman described metaphorically as a wilting violet and thus it has to be metaphori-
cally interpreted by means of a pragmatic resolution of transfer (romero and Soria 2013c, 
150). Or it may be used to talk about a fictional wilting violet in a fairy tale and thus it has 
to be interpreted as a fictional animated violet. The selection of one of these potential types 
of interpretations cannot be elucidated without appeal to the intentions of the speaker and 
thus different pragmatic processes may be demanded to express a complete proposition by 
means of the same sentence.11 The semantic mismatch triggers the search of subproposi-
tional content that eventually allows the composition, and it is the job of pragmatics to 
supply the specific conceptual addition or modulation to get the determinate truth-con-
ditions in the interpretation of (10) in its context of utterance. When there is lack of se-
mantic coordination, a pragmatic adjustment is ineliminable both linguistically and truth-
conditionally;12 its demand is not pragmatically but semantically constrained. However, 
11 Lack of semantic coordination is not always a signal of a covert variable whose saturation allows com-
position as Stern (2006 and 2011) would argue. Compositionally mandatoryL demands do not always 
have to follow the pragmatic operation of saturation of a variable as in recanati’s explanation of the 
noun-noun cases. Different pragmatic strategies can be mandatorily demanded: not only saturation 
but also cases of transfer and supplementation (romero and Soria 2013a, 165).
12 Modulation processes often have a linguistically mandatory demand and more often than not this is the 
case of metaphor and metonymy. It is true that not all the metaphorical or metonymical utterances include 
a sentence that shows lack of semantic coordination (see example (2) in this paper), but most cases do. 
https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.17683 67
Semantic content and compositional context-sensitivity
the effect of the resolution of semantic compositional infelicity cannot be treated as part of 
semantics (it is the demand rather than the contextual effects that is semantic). We do not 
know what the world would have to be like simply in virtue of the standing meaning of the 
words in (10) relative to the narrow context. What semantics delivers for a sentence such 
as (10) will not be something capable of truth evaluation. (10) is an indexical-free and yet 
compositionally context-sensitive expression.
To back our claim that examples including some lack of semantic coordination do not 
express minimal propositions, we can resort to experimental evidence. For example, an ex-
periment run by Giora et al. shows that “outside a supportive context, participants with AS 
[Asperger Syndrome] did not invest in processing novel metaphors but rather dismissed 
them as meaningless” (2012, 42). This can be taken as evidence that a literal reading with-
out appeal to context is not possible for an expression when there is lack of semantic coor-
dination since “Asperger’s Syndrome (AS) involves difficulties in social communication 
but no delays in language or cognitive development” (Giora et al. 2012, 22). Interpretation 
of complex expressions when there are “incompatible meanings” (Giora et al. 2012, 41) is 
considered as meaningless by participants with AS as well as by many, but not all, of the 
participants in the comparison group. We can hypothesize that lack of semantic coordina-
tion is the reason why the participant with AS cannot conceive (10) as meaningful. When 
some participants in the comparison group consider them interpretable, they do only by 
the provision of a potential non-literal context by appeal to their better abilities in social 
communication. Such a participant in the comparison group might entertain a possible ap-
propriate figurative or fictional context to make it interpretable, that is, intelligible.
Another more specific experimental work designed to test semantic integration also 
shows that, for AS participants, “the effort invested in novel metaphor comprehension is 
similar to that required for processing unrelated, nonsensical word combinations” (Gold 
and Faust 2012, 62). If participants with AS, who are proficient in literal interpretation, 
group novel metaphorical expressions together with nonsensical word combinations, we 
can take it as evidence that it is not possible for a hearer to entertain the literal truth-condi-
tional contribution of an expression that lacks semantic coordination.13
These experimental data are not the only type of evidence to claim that lack of seman-
tic coordination precludes literal readings and thus, minimal propositions. The intra-lin-
guistic task of anaphoric binding in metaphorical or metonymical utterances also gives us 
reasons to support it. If we argue that the intra-linguistic task of anaphoric binding involves 
agreement, which we can assume to be one of the constraints included in Borg’s “organiza-
tional lexical semantics” (2012, 166), it is not possible to claim that (11)
(11) The wilting violet forgot her purse when she left the room
13 These experiments show that for both groups interpreting novel items (whether literal, e.g. ‘Tverian 
horse’ or metaphorical, e.g. ‘Dying Star’) is costly and error-prone compared to interpreting familiar 
ones when supportive context is provided. Both invest more time to respond to novel literals and novel 
metaphor. Outside a supportive context, however, adults with AS did not take longer to respond to 
novel metaphors while typically developing adults did. Furthermore, the time invested in novel meta-
phor comprehension for AS participants is similar to that required to dismiss nonsensical word combi-
nations (e.g. ‘bunny laundry’) as meaningless. This can be taken as evidence that, in these cases, adults 
with AS did not invest in processing novel metaphors.
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expresses a false proposition. Without the sub-propositional intention-sensitive pragmatic 
adjustment in each of the possible biasing contexts (metaphorical, metonymical or fic-
tional), the intra-linguistic task of binding the pronouns ‘her’ and ‘she’ to their anteced-
ent ‘the wilting violet’ is not possible due to lack of agreement. Indeed, if ‘the wilting vio-
let’ were metonymically used to refer to a man wearing a violet on his sleeve, the pronouns 
should have been ‘his’ and ‘he’ instead of ‘her’ and ‘she’. There are cases of anaphoric bind-
ing whose resolution involves a previously modulated antecedent. As recanati says
An anaphoric pronoun acquires a character only when its index, and possibly (some of) the addi-
tional parameters necessary to determine its content (type of role, referential or descriptive in-
terpretation, situation of evaluation), have been contextually fixed. This point, which I can only 
mention in passing, is of some importance given its potential consequences for the structure of 
the theory of meaning, and especially for the division of labour between semantics and pragma-
tics. (recanati 2005, 313)
Example (11) is especially interesting, since we can use syntactic arguments to show that it 
does not state a condition for truth as a whole if taken literally. We can only say that the ut-
terance of (11) in a metaphorically biasing context is true if and only if the female person 
who has characteristics analogous to a wilting violet forgot her purse when she left. Only in 
a non-literal reading, can we get the animate subject needed for the felicitous composition 
of it with the mental process encoded by ‘forgot’ and the modulated meaning of the phrase 
is demanded mandatorily on pains of ungrammaticality due to vacuous binding of the ex-
plicit variables ‘her’ and ‘she’ in the syntax of (11). This constitutes the kind of syntactic ev-
idence for context-sensitivity that minimalists look for. In Borg’s words:
Minimalism for me is the view that there can be no lexico-syntactic context-sensitivity with-
out clear, independent evidence of that context-sensitivity, i.e. without clear behavioural evidence 
(say, about the way the expression combines with other expressions) and this will be the kind of 
evidence to be delivered by those working in linguistics departments (…). (Borg 2012, 89)
Taking into account that we “need to accommodate the intra-linguistic behaviour of ex-
pressions” (Borg 2012, 214), not even variable resolution is always independent from mo-
dulation since some examples of anaphoric pronouns are bound to modulated or extended 
meanings. The following examples (12)-(13)
(12) When the wilting violet left, the waiter said she was ill
(13) When the wilting violet left, the waitress said he was ill
add evidence on this. It is not possible to account for the “appropriate concatenations of 
words” (Borg 2012, 214) in (12) and (13) to yield full-fledged truth-evaluable contents 
without appeal to wide context because there is a binding failure given that there is no fe-
male or male antecedent in the sentence for the anaphoric pronoun to inherit its semantic 
value. Given that the predicate ‘left’ constrains the type of argument role of the subject, we 
can infer that the speaker of ‘the wilting violet’ is using this expression to refer to an ani-
mate being and, by the linguistic information provided by the pronouns, the hearer knows 
that the referent is a female animate being in (12) and a male animate being in (13). Fol-
lowing Borg’s way of resolving indexicality, we would obtain a proposition guided by the 
following description for referring with ‘she’ in (12), ‘the actual female person referred to 
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by the speaker of this token of (12)’ but this description does not agree with the linguistic 
meaning of ‘the wilting violet’ either. The same applies mutatis mutandis to (13). This lack 
of linguistic agreement between the anaphoric pronoun and the antecedent results in vacu-
ous binding and thus in semantic failure unless the conceptual connectivity between them 
is constructed by means of the hearer’s inference to get to what the speaker (intentionally) 
referred to. Guided by the demand of the predicate ‘left the room’ to get an element sat-
isfying the requirement [+animate being] to saturate the argument slot for its subject 
and by the search of what the speaker intends to refer to by the use of ‘she’ in (12) or ‘he’ 
in (13), the hearer will choose one of the pragmatic processes available (e.g. transfer or con-
ceptual addition) to find suitable content for the antecedent so that anaphoric binding is 
eventually allowed.
If examples (7)-(13) are really examples of compositional context-sensitivity, the lin-
guistically mandatory demand due to lack of semantic coordination frees the conception 
of mandatoryL from the necessary condition that the mandatory demand can only be re-
solved by some token-reflexive descriptions. The pragmatic process demanded by context-
sensitive expressions does not always provide us with minimal propositions without appeal 
to speaker’s intentions. This amendment affects the core tenet of minimal semantics, since 
the recovery of complete semantic content is not possible without appeal to wide context. 
In this sense, Borg’s minimal propositions are not a viable option for all sentences. At least 
for examples of metaphorical or metonymical anaphor, even Borg would have to dismiss 
the idea that all sentences deliver propositional semantic content.
Two of the crucial standard minimalist tenets (ii and iii in 2.2) are now refuted. The 
evidence provided in the analysis of cases such as (7)-(13) shows that not all mandatory de-
mands of contextual information are traced to a lexico-syntactic item and that not all man-
datory demands must be resolved automatically from a narrow context. There are linguis-
tic and compositional mandatory demands of intention-sensitive contextual information 
which can only be obtained by a non-automatic pragmatic resolution. Intention-insensitive 
contextual information is not enough to obtain a minimal proposition in all cases. Thus, 
propositionalism has to be rejected.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have posed the question of whether the semantic content, when paired 
with sentences related to a narrow context, is propositional and we have concluded that the 
content semantically expressed by a well-formed declarative sentence (with respect to the 
narrow context of utterance) may not be a proposition.
Our argument is based on the recognition that the linguistic and truth-conditional 
demands of contextual information may arise not only lexically but also compositionally 
and this kind of (often indexical-free) context-sensitivity cannot be resolved just by appeal 
to narrow context. Compositionally context-sensitive sentences linguistically (and truth-
conditionally) trigger pragmatic adjustment. The pragmatic adjustments required by this 
type of context-sensitivity, however, cannot be resolved automatically from a narrow con-
text, nor can it be eliminated by means of a context-insensitive covert syntactic structure 
(the two lines of argument a standard minimalist could admit). Furthermore, these prag-
matic effects cannot be explained by positing a context-sensitive covert syntactic structure 
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that triggers a saturation process as non-standard minimalists could argue. Non-automatic 
pragmatic resolution such as metaphorical modulation or metonymical supplementation, 
which is guided by the search of speaker’s intentions, is often mandatorily demanded by 
compositional context-sensitivity.
This reveals our disagreement with the main tenet of standard minimalism. If compo-
sitional context-sensitivity is admitted, as we do, the minimal proposition which standard 
minimalism posits cannot always be obtained; it cannot be automatically determined by 
the rules of the language without appeal to speaker’s intentions. The propositionalist ac-
count of semantic content is unfeasible and the notion of minimal proposition for a sen-
tence related to a narrow context is incoherent. If semantics is understood as delivering fully 
truth-evaluable propositions, a semantic theory cannot be constructed for linguistic expres-
sions plus narrow context.
If it makes sense to speak of minimal propositions, these must be obtained for utter-
ances and must be recovered by appeal to wide context as both non-standard minimalists 
and contextualists do. Nevertheless, they would also have to include the proposals that con-
textual information is not always demanded by variables (saturation) and that there are 
non-literal minimal propositions. The minimal propositions expressed by utterances whose 
sentences are compositionally context-sensitive may be non-literal. Thus, the contrast be-
tween what the speaker means and what she literally says, a contrast posited by non-stand-
ard minimalists, is illusory. For us and for contextualists, what the speaker says may be lit-
eral or not.
This does not mean that compositional context-sensitivity serves as support to contex-
tualism. If we understand that a demand of a process of interpretation is mandatory when 
it is necessary for propositional content to be present in the interpretation of an utterance, 
then modulation processes triggered by compositional context-sensitivity cannot be clas-
sified as optional processes of interpretation. The contextualist cannot argue for her posi-
tion saying that there are optional processes of interpretation involved in what the speaker 
explicitly expresses. Her challenge is to show that the minimal proposition expressed by an 
utterance is not always the proposition intended by the speaker, or that there are optional 
demands of contextual information to get what the speaker says. This, however, is another 
story.
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